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J. Stewart McClendon*
L Introduction
Parties to commercial transactions have long enjoyed the free-
dom to submit to arbitration in preference to litigation almost any
kind of a dispute arising out of their relationships. After a dispute
arises, it is sometimes necessary, however, to seek court assistance to
compel a reluctant party to comply with the agreement to arbitrate
and, on occasion, to abandon or defer litigation of the dispute.
Upon request for an order to compel compliance, U.S. courts will
examine the agreement to arbitrate to see whether it was validly
made and whether it encompasses the subject matter of the dispute.
In so doing, U.S. courts, occasionally for public policy reasons, have
determined that some matters are not arbitrable. While most of
these suits have arisen in a domestic context, similar analyses have
been employed in both domestic and international cases.
In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,I decided
at the end of the 1984-85 term, the Supreme Court extended its
1974 holding in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. 2 by relaxing judicially cre-
ated limitations on subject matter arbitrability in international cases.
It now appears that there will be no restrictions in those cases unless
Congress imposes them.3 This artide will examine the historical
background leading to Mitsubishi Motors, the issues decided by the
Court, and some of the issues the Court did not decide and thus
remain for future determination.
IL Historical Background
Prior to the 1920s, agreements to arbitrate future disputes were
generally unenforceable in the United States. Indeed, courts regu-
larly found such agreements to be encroachments on the province of
* Of counsel, Satterlee & Stephens, New York, N.Y.; Vice Chairman, International
Advisory Committee, World Arbitration Institute; Member of the New York, Texas and
Minnesota bars.
1 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985), modifing 732 F.2d 155 (1st Cir. 1983).
2 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
3 Mitubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3361 n.21.
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the judiciary and contrary to public policy. 4 The United States Arbi-
tration Act of 19255 changed all that. Section 2 of the Act provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evi-
dencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or
the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agree-
ment in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy aris-
ing out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
6
Section 1 of the Arbitration Act provides that nothing in the Act
"shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employ-
ees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce." 7 No other restriction, exception, or caveat with respect
to subject matter arbitrability is contained in the original Arbitration
Act.
The Arbitration Act does not, however, oust the courts com-
pletely from the arbitral process. When a suit is brought "upon any
issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing," a court
is authorized by section 3 to stay any trial "until such arbitration has
been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing
the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such
arbitration." Before granting a stay the court will satisfy itself that
the issue is "referable to arbitration under such an agreement" and
consider allegations of default (waiver of arbitration). Section 4 di-
rects a court to order arbitration "upon being satisfied that the mak-
ing of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply
therewith is not in issue."9 The court may also appoint arbitrators,
compel attendance of witnesses, and vacate, modify, and confirm
awards.10 Only sections 3 and 4 relate to advance determination of
matters connected with the scope of the arbitration agreement, and
these provisions permit the courts to deal only with limited issues-
whether there was an agreement to arbitrate a given issue,'I whether
there was a refusal to arbitrate,' 2 and whether there was a waiver of
the right to arbitrate.' 5
4 See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 512 n.4. See also Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.)
445 (1874) (state statute prohibiting out of state corporations from removing any trial to
federal court held unconstitutional); Tatsuma Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha v. Prescott, 4 F.2d
670 (9th Cir. 1925) (courts will not enforce a charter provision requiring all disputes to be
settled first by arbitration as this infringes upon federal jurisdiction).
5 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
6 Id § 2.
7 Id 1.
8 Id §3.
9 Id 4.
10 Id §i5, 7,9-11.
11 § 3,4.
12 Id § 4.
IS Id § 2.
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Despite the broad acceptance of arbitrability in the Arbitration
Act and the limitations on the scope of court review of agreements to
arbitrate, certain matters have been held to be nonarbitrable. Patent
validity and infringement is one example. In 1930, the U.S. District
Court of Delaware held that a controversy over patent validity did
not involve commerce and therefore did not fall under the Arbitra-
tion Act.14 Later cases denied the arbitrability of patent disputes for
public policy reasons, stressing the great public interest in monitor-
ing patent validity because patents confer limited monopolies.15
Such public policy considerations, however, did not prevent Con-
gress from adopting legislation in 1982 and 1984 authorizing arbi-
tration of patent validity, infringement, and interference questions. 1 6
In 1953 the Supreme Court decided Wilko v. Swan, 17 holding
that a provision of the Securities Act of 1933, voiding any waiver of
compliance with that Act, prevented enforcement of an agreement to
arbitrate. That case involved an arbitration provision in a brokerage
contract. The issue was whether the customer was entitled to have
his claim of misrepresentation determined by a court, as provided by
section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933,18 or whether he could be
compelled to submit the matter to arbitration.' 9 The Court had to
determine whether an agreement to arbitrate a future controversy
violated the provisions of section 14 of the Securities Act of 1933,20
making void "[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provision binding any
person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provi-
sion" of the Securities Act of 1933.21
Although there was no suggestion that a contract of adhesion
was involved, the Court stressed that Congress believed that broker-
age customers needed protection. It also emphasized that the Secur-
ities Act gave the brokerage customer a wide choice of venues for his
action, a choice that would be lost if the customer were forced to
arbitrate.22 In closing, the Court said:
Two policies, not easily reconcilable, are involved in this case ....
Recognizing the advantages that prior agreements for arbitration
may provide for the solution of commercial controversies, we decide
that the intention of Congress concerning the sale of securities is
better carried out by holding invalid such an agreement for arbitra-
14 Zip Mfg. Co. v. Pep Mfg. Co., 44 F.2d 184 (D. Del. 1930).
15 See Hoellering, New Opportunitiesfor PatentArbitration, N.Y.Lj., Dec. 23, 1985, at 1,
col. 1.
16 35 U.S.C. § 294 (1982); Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622,
§ 105, 98 Stat. 3383, 3385 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 135(d)).
17 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
18 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982).
19 Wdlko, 346 U.S. at 430.
20 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982).
21 l
22 Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435.
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tion of issues arising under the Act. 23
Thus, while the Court commenced with an examination of
whether the agreement to arbitrate amounted to a "condition, stipu-
lation, or provision" waiving compliance with the Securities Act of
1933, it closed with broad language resolving conflicting congres-
sional policies. The broad language was later relied on to extend the
court-created limitation on subject matter arbitrability to other areas.
Wilko made two other important points that will be discussed
more fully below. One was that the limitation on subject matter arbi-
trability does not extend to agreements to arbitrate made after the
dispute arose. The Court said that "[wihile the Securities Act does
not require petitioner to sue, a waiver in advance of a controversy
stands upon a different footing."' 24 The premise that limitations on
subject matter arbitrability apply only to agreements to arbitrate fu-
ture disputes has been repeated a number of times since then and
was cited by the Court in Mitsubishi as one reason for not disallowing
arbitration of antitrust claims in international arbitrations.2 5
Wilko also discussed the extent of judicial review of arbitral
awards. The Court questioned whether the review provisions of the
Arbitration Act would give adequate protection from erroneous stat-
utory interpretation contained in an arbitral award. It noted that
"[iun unrestricted submissions.... the arbitrators in contrast to man-
ifest disregard are not subject, in federal courts, to judicial review for
error of interpretation. ' 26 This language was the origin of the con-
cept that an award can be vacated if it was made in "manifest disre-
gard of the law," an idea repeated in later cases27 and discussed
below. 28
In 1967 the Supreme Court extended the scope of arbitrability
in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Corp. ,29 holding that when
a contract contains a broad arbitration clause, the arbitrator, not a
court, will decide whether the contract was fraudulently induced. A
"broad" arbitration clause covers disputes "relating to," not merely
"arising out of," the contract.30 The Court ruled that the agreement
to arbitrate was separable from the main contract and that although
courts will determine the validity of the former, the validity of the
latter can be arbitrated. 3'
23 Id. at 438.
24 Idi; see also id (Jackson, J., concurring).
25 Mitubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3355.
26 346 U.S. at 436-37.
27 See Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale du Papier, 508 F.2d
969, 977 (2d Cir. 1974); I/S. Stavborg v. National Metal Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d 424,
430-32 (2d Cir. 1974).
28 See infra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
29 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
so Id. at 398.
31 Id. at 404.
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The following year, in American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Mc-
Guire & Co. ,32 the Second Circuit, relying on Wilko, held that antitrust
issues were not arbitrable for public policy reasons. Unlike Wilko,
the court could not point to any specific provision of the Sherman
Act that conflicted with the Arbitration Act, but instead based its de-
cision on the great public interest in antitrust enforcement and the
importance of private antitrust suits to the enforcement frame-
work.35 The court gave four reasons for its conclusion: the impor-
tant role played by private plaintiffs in antitrust enforcement would
be lost in arbitration; contracts giving rise to antitrust suits are likely
to be contracts of adhesion; antitrust issues are too complicated for
arbitrators; and businessmen-arbitrators are not appropriate judges
of violations of the antitrust laws.3 4
In 1970, the United States acceded to the 1958 United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, and Congress enacted implementing legislation by amend-
ment to the Arbitration Act.3 5 Article I of the Convention deals with
arbitral awards; article II deals with agreements to arbitrate and pro-
vides in pertinent part:
1. Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing
under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any
differences which have arisen or which may arise between them in
respect to a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not,
concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration ....
3. The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a
matter in respect of which the parties have made an agreement
within the meaning of this article, shall, at the request of one of the
parties refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agree-
ment is null and void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed.36
Article V establishes the grounds for refusal to recognize and en-
force awards, one ground being that "the recognition of enforce-
ment of the award would be contrary to the public policy of [the
forum] country."' s7
Chapter 2 of the Arbitration Act, in addition to providing that
the Convention shall be enforced in accordance with the chapter,
goes on to provide:
An arbitration agreement or arbitral award arising out of a legal re-
lationship, whether contractual or not, which is considered as com-
mercial, including a transaction, contract, or agreement described in
32 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
3s hi at 826.
34 Id at 827.
s5 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbi-
tral Awards, June 10, 1958, art. II, §§ 1, 3, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330
U.N.T.S. 38 (codified at 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1982)). The then existing Act became chapter 1,
and the implementing legislation for the Convention was added as chapter 2 of the Arbi-
tration Act.
36 Id art. II, §§ 1, 3 (emphasis added).
37 Id art. V. § 2(b).
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section 2 of this title, falls under the Convention. An agreement or
award arising out of such a relationship which is entirely between
citizens of the United States shall be deemed not to fall under the
convention unless that relationship involves property located
abroad, envisages performance or enforcement abroad, or has some
other reasonable relation with one or more foreign states .... 38
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. ,9 was the first major case involving an
international agreement to arbitrate decided after the adoption of
the Convention. It dealt with the issue of whether enforcement of an
arbitration clause would defeat the remedial scheme established by
Congress in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.40 The ScIerk Court
first distinguished its 1933 Securities Act holding in Wilko by saying:
At the outset, a colorable argument could be made that even the
semantic reasoning of the Wilko opinion does not control the case
before us.... There is no statutory counterpart of 12(2) in the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934, and neither 10(b) of that Act nor
Rule lOb-5 speaks of a private remedy to redress violations of the
kind alleged here.41
Even assuming arguendo that the rationale in Wilko could be ap-
plied in a case involving the 1934 Act, the Court found "crucial dif-
ferences between the agreement involved in Wilko and the one
signed by the parties here. ' '42 The most significant of those differ-
ences was the international character of the transaction in Scherk, a
transaction involving different sets of national laws and attendant
conflict of law problems.
In assessing the enforceability of the arbitration clause in Scherk,
the Court relied on its decision in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. ,43
handed down two terms earlier. That case approved a forum-selec-
tion clause in a contract involving international trade, thereby over-
coming a long-held judicial reluctance to permit contracting parties
the freedom to choose a forum for future dispute resolution. It did
so because:
The expansion of American business and industry will hardly be en-
couraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a paro-
chial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and
in our courts .... We cannot have trade and commerce in world
markets and international waters exclusively on our terms, governed
by our laws and resolved in our courts.44
The Scherk Court found that "[a]n agreement to arbitrate before
a specified tribunal [was], in effect, a specialized kind of forum-selec-
tion clause that posits not only the situs of suit but also the proce-
38 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1982).
39 417 U.S. at 506.
40 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78ff (1982).
41 Scherk, 417 U.S. at 513.
42 ML at 515.
43 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
44 Id. at 9.
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dure used in resolving the dispute." 45 Citing its opinion in The
Bremen, the Court emphasized that" 'agreeing in advance on a forum
acceptable to both parties is an indispensable element in interna-
tional trade, commerce and contracting.' "46 The Court concluded
that a contractual dispute resolution mechanism is "an almost indis-
pensable precondition to achievement of the orderliness and pre-
dictability essential to any international business transaction. ' 47 "A
parochial refusal by the court of one country to enforce an interna-
tional arbitration agreement" would lead to a "legal no-man's land
[that] would surely damage the fabric of international commerce and
trade, and imperil the willingness and ability of businessmen to enter
into international commercial agreements. 48
The Court in Scherk thus found that the public interest in inter-
national trade and commerce was greater than any public interest
created by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. It did not explicitly
draw on the Convention or on chapter 2 of the Arbitration Act, but
noted that "[o]ur conclusion today is confirmed by international de-
velopments and domestic legislation in the area of commercial arbi-
tration subsequent to the Wilko decision," including the 1970
accession to and codification of the Convention.49
Since Scherk the Supreme Court has reiterated and reinforced its
commitment to arbitration, clarifying the supremacy of the Federal
Arbitration Act over conflicting state laws. In Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp. 50 the Court held erroneous the
refusal of a federal district court to order arbitration pending resolu-
tion of the arbitrability question in state court. The federal district
court should have immediately issued an order to arbitrate because it
was "Congress' clear intent in the Arbitration Act to move the par-
ties to an arbitrable dispute out of court and into arbitration as
quickly and easily as possible." 51
In Southland Corp. v. Keating52 the Court overturned a California
Supreme Court ruling that issues arising under the California
Franchise Investment Act were not arbitrable. It held that:
In enacting § 2 of the Federal Act, Congress declared a national pol-
icy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to re-
quire a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the
contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration .... 53
In creating a substantive rule in state as well as federal courts, Con-
45 Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519.
46 Id. at 518 (quoting The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 13-14).
47 Id at 516.
48 Id at 516-17.
49 Id at 520 n.15.
50 460 U.S. 1 (1982).
51 Id at 22.
52 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
53 Id at 10.
1986]
N.CJ. INT'L L. & CoM. REG.
gress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the
enforceability of arbitration agreements. We hold that ... the Cali-
fornia Franchise Investment Law violates the Supremacy clause.54
In Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd 55 the Court disapproved the
so-called "doctrine of intertwining," under which courts were given
discretion to deny arbitration of arbitrable claims when arbitrable
and nonarbitrable claims were intertwined factually and legally. The
Court said that:
the preeminent concern of Congress in passing the Act was to en-
force private agreements into which parties had entered, and that
concern requires that we vigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate,
even if the result is 'piecemeal' litigation, at least absent a counter-
vailing policy manifested in another federal statute.5 6
Countervailing statutory policies have been found in several
cases, none of which has involved a commercial dispute. Rather,
these cases discussed whether an individual's right to sue for viola-
tion of rights granted by federal statutes was precluded by an arbitra-
tion clause in a collective bargaining agreement. Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co. 57 involved assertion of rights under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964;58 Barrantine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc.59
involved the Fair Labor Standards Act;60 and McDonald v. City of West
Branch61 involved the Ku Klux Act of 1871.62 These cases did not
arise in proceeding to order or stay arbitration but came up on the
issue of the preclusive effect of an arbitration award under a collec-
tive bargaining agreement. In each, the Court stressed that the
agreement to arbitrate was not made by the party challenging the
preclusive effect of the award.
III. The Mitsubishi Case
A. The Setting
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. (Mitsubishi) was a Japanese corpora-
tion, a joint venture of Chrysler International, S.A. (Chrysler), a
Swiss corporation, and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Inc., a Japanese
corporation. Mitsubishi had its principal place of business in Japan,
where it manufactured motor vehicles for sale through Chrysler deal-
ers outside the continental United States. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc. (Soler) was a Chrysler dealer with its principal place of business
541 d at 16.
55 105 S. Ct. 1238 (1985).
5 1& at 1242-43.
57 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
58 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
59 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
60 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982).
61 104 S. Ct. 1799 (1984).
62 Ku Klux Act, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1982)).
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in Puerto Rico. In 1979 Soler and Mitsubishi entered into a "Sales
Procedure Agreement," which contained an arbitration clause pro-
viding that certain disputes would be arbitrated in Japan under the
rules of the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association. 63 It also pro-
vided that the agreement would "be governed by and construed in
all respects according to the laws of the Swiss Confederation as if
entirely performed therein."
The sales arrangement was profitable until the new car market
softened in 1981. Soler began to have difficulty selling its cars and
asked Mitsubishi to cancel some of its orders. It also attempted to
arrange for some of its vehicles to be transshipped to the continental
United States and Latin America for sale there. Mitsubishi refused to
authorize the transshipment and, because Soler was in default in pay-
ments for cars received, withheld shipment of a number of vehicles.
Mitsubishi commenced an action in federal court in Puerto Rico to
compel arbitration under sections 4 and 201 of the Arbitration Act.
In addition, Mitsubishi filed a request for arbitration with the Japan
Commercial Arbitration Association.65
Soler denied Mitsubishi's allegations and counterclaimed, alleg-
ing breaches of the Sales Procedure Agreement and asserting a
number of other claims under the Sherman Act, 66 the Federal Auto-
mobile Dealers' Day in Court Act,6 7 and several Puerto Rican stat-
utes. 68 The antitrust claims charged that Mitsubishi and Chrysler
had conspired to divide markets in restraint of trade by keeping
Soler out of Latin American and continental U.S. markets. 69
The district court held all of the claims and counterclaims arbi-
trable, except two and part of a third, none of which are relevant to
the issues considered in this article. It also retained jurisdiction over
Soler's antitrust claims. While noting that courts of appeals consid-
ering the issue had uniformly followed the lead of American Safety in
finding antitrust claims "inappropriate" for arbitration, the district
court held, on the authority of Scherh, that the international character
of the transaction between Mitsubishi and Soler required it to order
arbitration. 70
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit agreed with the dis-
trict court that state (Puerto Rican) laws could not frustrate arbitra-
tion provided for by the Arbitration Act and the Convention.
63 Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3347-48.
64 Id. at 3359 n.109.
65 Id at 3350.
66 Sherman Anti-Trust Act, ch. 647, §§ 1-7, 26 Stat. 209-10 (1890) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982)).
67 Ch. 1038, 70 Stat. 1125 (1956) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225
(1982)).
68 P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 10, §§ 257-278 (1978 & Supp. 1983).
69 Misubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3355.
70 Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 162.
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Additionally, the court held that an agreement to arbitrate statutory
claims can be found within the terms of a general arbitration clause
and need not be specifically mentioned and that the arbitration
clause was broad enough to encompass all the statutory claims, in-
cluding antitrust claims. It refused, however, to order arbitration of
the antitrust claims, finding that neither Scherk nor the Convention
required abandonment of the American Safety doctrine.71
The case attracted a great deal of interest. Amicus briefs were
filed by the United States, the American Arbitration Association, and
the International Chamber of Commerce. The United States urged
the Court not to permit arbitrators to consider antitrust issues; the
two arbitral institutions, of course, favored extension of the arbitral
process.
The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court finding that the
arbitration clause encompassed Soler's statutory counterclaims (ex-
cept, of course, those set aside by the district court), but reversed its
finding that antitrust issues are not arbitrable in an international set-
ting. 72 Justice Blackmun wrote the majority opinion and was joined
by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Rehnquist, and
O'Connor. Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion in which Jus-
tice Brennan joined and in which Justice Marshall also joined except
as to Part II, relating to arbitrability of statutory claims without ex-
press agreement of the parties. Justice Powell took no part.7 3
B. The Mitsubishi Holdings
As noted above, two principal questions faced the Court:
whether a general agreement to arbitrate encompasses claims arising
from statutes designed to protect a class to which the party resisting
arbitration belongs; and, if the answer to that question is in the af-
firmative, whether U.S. courts should enforce agreements to arbi-
trate future antitrust claims when such agreements arise out of
international transactions. It was the latter issue that persuaded the
Court to grant certiorari. 74
1. Statutory Claims
In finding that arbitration of so-called statutory claims does not
require express agreement by the parties, the Court looked first at
the Arbitration Act. It observed that there is no basis in the Arbitra-
tion Act for "implying in every contract within its ken a presumption
against arbitration of statutory claims." '75 The Court then examined
71 Id at 168-69.
72 Miusubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3355.
73 Id at 3349.
74 Id at 3353.
75 Id.
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what the parties had agreed to arbitrate, taking into account the lib-
eral federal policy favoring arbitration agreements. It pointed out
that federal substantive law of arbitration requires that:
questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard
for the federal policy favoring arbitration .... The Arbitration Act
establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning
the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitra-
tion, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract
language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to
arbitrability.76
The Court did not go so far as to suggest that all statutory
claims are arbitrable. Other federal statutes might circumscribe the
generally broad range of arbitrable claims under the Arbitration
Act. 7 7 In passing, the Court also noted that agreements to arbitrate,
like all contracts, are subject to revocation on grounds such as fraud
or overwhelming economic power.78 It refused, however, to con-
sider whether claims under the Federal Automobile Dealers' Day in
Court Act were arbitrable, because Soler did not raise the issue in
the court below or in its cross-petition for certiorari. 79
The Court then endorsed the circuit court's examination of the
scope of the arbitration clause, noting that the clause extended to all
factual allegations "arising 'out of' or 'in relation to' " enumerated
sections of the sales agreement, regardless of "the legal labels at-
tached to those allegations." 80 Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion
took the opposite tack in construing the Arbitration Act, insisting
that:
The plain language of this [arbitration] statute encompasses Soler's
claims that arise out of its contract with Mitsubishi, but does not
encompass a claim arising under federal law, or indeed one that
arises under its distributor agreement with Chrysler. Nothing in the
text of the 1925 Act, nor its legislative history, suggests that Con-
gress intended to authorize the arbitration of any statutory claims. 81
The dissent emphasized that "[u]ntil today all of our cases enforcing
agreements to arbitrate under the Arbitration Act have involved con-
tract claims."' 82 He distinguished Scherk from the instant case by stat-
ing that the breach of contractual warranty in that case was also
claimed to be actionable under the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934, whereas Soler's statutory claims "have only an indirect rela-
tionship to the contract." 83 Justice Stevens also stressed that the
Court had refused to order arbitration in cases arising under Title
76 Id. at 3354.
77 Id. at 3355.
78 Id. at 3354.
79 d. at 3352 n.ll.
80 Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 159.
81 Mitubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3364 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
82 ld
83 Id. at 3365 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Fair Labor Standards Act,
and the Ku Klux Act of 1871.
From this portion of the Mitsubishi decision it is possible to draw
two conclusions. First, a "broad" arbitration clause generally en-
compasses statutory claims arising out of the contractual transaction.
The parties to a contract may, of course, restrict the scope of arbitra-
tion by appropriate language in the arbitration clause. They should
be aware, however, that if the restrictive language is not clear, the
courts will resolve doubts in favor of arbitrability. Second, where
statutory claims are asserted, the presumption of arbitrability may be
rebutted only by showing some clear congressional intent "to pre-
clude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at
issue." 84
2. Antitrust Claims
The majority opinion in Mitsubishi emphasized that neither the
Arbitration Act nor the Sherman Act excepted antitrust claims from
international arbitration.8 5 Although the Court found it unnecessary
to pass on the application of the American Safety doctrine to domestic
arbitration, it nevertheless scrutinized the four reasons given by the
Court in that case for precluding arbitration of antitrust disputes and
found them not altogether convincing. It found three of the con-
cerns unjustified or unpersuasive.
To the concern "that contracts which generate antitrust disputes
may be contracts of adhesion,"8s 6 the Court gave two responses.
First, "[t]he mere appearance of an antitrust dispute does not alone
warrant invalidation of the selected forum on the undemonstrated
assumption that the arbitration clause is tainted."' Second, a party
may directly attack an agreement to arbitrate and show that it was
procured by fraud, undue influence, or overwhelming bargaining
power.88
The Mitsubishi Court also took issue with the notion that the
complex nature of antitrust disputes make them ill-suited to arbitra-
tion.8 9 The Court noted the inconsistency of a policy forbidding ar-
bitration agreements encompassing future antitrust disputes but
permitting agreements to arbitrate antitrust claims entered into after
such disputes arise. It also stated that antitrust issues in arbitrations
frequently involve vertical restraints that do not often give rise to the
"monstrous proceedings" commonly associated with antitrust cases.
Further, arbitrators can be selected for their expertise, other experts
84 Id. at 3355.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 3357.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
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can be employed, and parties may prefer a streamlined dispute reso-
lution proceeding to keep costs and efforts within manageable
bounds.90
Finally, the Court disputed the American Safety rationale that "de-
cisions as to antitrust regulations of business are too important to be
lodged in arbitrators chosen from the business community-particu-
larly those from a foreign community that has had no experience
with or exposure to our law and values." 91 The Court pointed out
that international arbitrators are frequently selected from the legal
community, particularly when the dispute involves important legal
issues. It declined "to indulge the presumption that the parties and
arbitral body conducting a proceeding will be unable or unwilling to
retain competent, conscientious, and impartial arbitrators. ' 92
The Court characterized as the "core of the American Safety doc-
trine" the notion that "private parties play a pivotal role in aiding
governmental enforcement of the antitrust laws by means of the pri-
vate action for treble damages."9 3 While admitting that "[t]he treble-
damages provision wielded by the private litigant is a chief tool in the
antitrust enforcement scheme, posing a crucial deterrent to potential
violators," the Court went on to point out that it was primarily a
remedial provision.94 Because "the antitrust cause of action remains
at all times under the control of the individual litigant," however,
there is no requirement that the cause of action be brought or pur-
sued and no restriction on the litigant's right to settle.95 The Mitsub-
ishi Court thus held that where the international character of a
transaction further complicates "dispute resolution the prospective
litigant may provide in advance for a mutually agreeable procedure
whereby he would seek his antitrust recovery as well as settle other
controversies." 96
The Court relied heavily on Scherk and included the following
quotation from that decision:
A contractual provision specifying in advance the forum in which
disputes shall be litigated and the law to be applied is ... an almost
indispensible precondition to achievement of the orderliness and
predictability essential to any international business transaction....
'A parochial refusal by the courts of one country to enforce any in-
ternational arbitration agreement would not only frustrate these
purposes, but would invite unseemly andmutually destructive jock-
eying by the parties to secure tactical litigation advantages .. .[It
would] damage the fabric of international commerce and trade and
imperil the willingness and ability of businessmen to enter into in-
90 Id at 3357-58.
91 Id at 3357.
92 1d at 3358.
93 Id at 3357.
94 Id. at 3358-59.
95 Id at 3359.96Id
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ternational commercial agreements.'
97
Finally, the Court pointed out that U.S. courts would have an
opportunity at the time of enforcement of the award to assess
whether antitrust issues had been properly considered by the arbitra-
tor. In this connection, it noted that "[w]hile the efficacy of the arbi-
tral process requires that substantive review at the award-
enforcement stage remain minimal, it would not require intrusive in-
quiry to ascertain that the tribunal took cognizance of the antitrust
claims and actually decided them." 98
Justice Stevens' dissent reiterated the view that private agree-
ments to arbitrate statutory claims are unenforceable, maintaining
that the rationale behind the collective bargaining cases applied with
special force to the federal policy protected by the antitrust laws. He
reviewed in detail the importance of antitrust enforcement to the
free enterprise system and the role played by private treble damage
suits in this enforcement. He was also concerned that "[a]rbitration
awards are only reviewable for manifest disregard of the law," and
that arbitral procedures frequently generate a record that "is so in-
adequate that the arbitrator's decision is virtually unreviewable." 99
He leveled some rather harsh criticisms at the arbitral process:
Despotic decision making of this kind is fine for parties who are will-
ing to agree in advance to settle for a best approximation of the cor-
rect result in order to resolve quickly and inexpensively any
contractual dispute that may arise in an ongoing commercial rela-
tionship. Such informality, however, is simply unacceptable when
every error may have devastating consequences for important busi-
nesses in our national economy and may undermine their ability to
compete in world markets. 10 0
He further suggested that the greatest risk of arbitration is the po-
tential invalidation of business practices that do not violate the anti-
trust laws.' 0 '
C. Application of the Convention
Although the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit made a de-
tailed examination of the Convention and its applicability to the Mit-
subishi dispute, the Supreme Court said very little about the
Convention, relying instead on Scherk and The Bremen. 10 2 There was
little discussion of the Convention in Scherk, except the comment that
the adoption of the Convention by the United States and the passage
of the enabling legislation in chapter 2 of the Arbitration Act con-
97 Id. at 3356 (quoting Scherk, 417 U.S. at 516-17).
98 Id at 3360.
99 Id. at 3370 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
100 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
101 Id at 3370 n.32 (StevensJ., dissenting).
102 Id at 3360.
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firmed its conclusion in favor of arbitrability.' 03
The Court in Mitubishi indicated that the federal policy favoring
arbitration has "appl[ied] with special force" in international trans-
actions since 1970, when the United States acceded to the Conven-
tion. 1°4 It also recognized that the Convention reserves to the
contracting states the right to refuse award enforcement when to do
so would be against the public policy of that country.' 0 5
In his dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the right to refuse
award enforcement, embodied in article V, when read in conjunction
with the article II provisions for enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments, establishes a basis for declining to permit arbitration of anti-
trust claims.' 0 6 The majority, however, declined to find an antitrust
exception to arbitrability of international disputes when Congress
had not expressly made such exception.' 0 7 It reasoned that:
The utility of the Convention in promoting the process of interna-
tional commercial arbitration depends upon the willingness of na-
tional courts to let go of matters they normally would think of as
their own. Doubtless, Congress may specify categories of claims it
wishes to reserve for decision by our own courts without contraven-
ing this Nation's obligations under the Convention. But we decline
to subvert the spirit of the United States' accession to the Conven-
tion by recognizing subject matter exceptions where Congress has
not expressly directed the courts to do so. 10 8
This language may have been the Court's way of refutingJustice
Stevens' contention that Convention articles II and V should be read
together. By saying that Congress, and not the courts, should make
exceptions to subject matter arbitrability under the Convention, the
Court in effect concluded that the article V right to refuse to enforce
awards violating the forum's public policy does not apply in deter-
mining whether to order arbitration.
The prospect of ordering arbitration of a dispute whose award
would be unenforceable seemed to bother the court below. "We are
mystified," the Court said, "at the sense of, say, having to refer to
arbitration a dispute involving the selling of slaves, knowing that the
award could never be enforced."' 1 9 There is a vast difference, how-
ever, between arbitration of a dispute arising out of an agreement
that is illegal on its face (a slave sale) and one involving an agree-
ment that may or may not be tainted with illegality, depending on
facts that will be adduced and examined in arbitration (a violation of
the Sherman Act or other antitrust statute).
103 Scherk, 417 U.S. at 520 n.15.
104 Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3357.
105 Id at 3360.
106 Id at 3371 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
107 id at 3361 n.21.
108 Id
109 Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 164.
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No court has yet said that antitrust issues are never arbitrable.
Courts have said only that agreements to arbitrate future disputes
will not be enforced as to allegations of antitrust violations. Presum-
ably, an award involving antitrust issues, resulting from an agree-
ment to arbitrate made after the dispute arose, would not be vacated
merely because it included the antitrust issues. The award might,
however, be unenforceable because of the manner in which the anti-
trust issues were decided. If the arbitrator so misconstrued the anti-
trust laws that the award was made "in manifest disregard of the law"
or was so egregiously wrong as to violate public policy, a court would
not confirm or enforce the award. This is quite different from refus-
ing to allow arbitrators to consider antitrust issues. Furthermore, in
the case of subject matter that is clearly not arbitrable, there is no
reason to believe that an arbitrator would not also find it not arbitra-
ble. Leaving arbitrability to arbitrators in the first instance is the
practice in many European countries, where arbitrators determine
their competence, subject to later review by the courts.110
IV. Questions for the Future
The majority and dissenting opinions in Mitsubishi agreed that
under the Convention a contracting state has the right to limit the
subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration. The majority,
however, said that any limitations should be imposed by Congress,
not by the courts." I It thus implicitly suggested that articles II and V
of the Convention need not be read together," 12 as Justice Stevens
so maintained. 13
It is at the award stage that most questions for future resolution
will arise. The majority and dissenting opinions agreed that review
of arbitral awards was limited, but disagreed on the efficacy of such
review. The majority noted that the Convention grants to the forum
court the right to refuse enforcement of an award that is contrary to
the forum's public policy and indicated that it thought that such an
examination would not be too difficult. 1 4 The dissent maintained
that "arbitration awards are only reviewable for manifest disregard
110 In many European countries, the arbitrator has the power, frequently referred to
by the phrase "competence-competence," to determine jurisdiction subject to court re-
view at the time of the award. See, e.g., Glossner, National Report on Federal Republic of Ger.
many, 4 Y.B. CoM. Aim. 72-73 (1979); Derain, National Report on France, 6 Y.B. CoM. Ann.
17 (1981); Sanders, National Report on the Netherlands, 4 Y.B. CoM. Ann. 74 (1980).
111 Mitubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3361 n.21.
112 See Development Bank of the Philippines v. Chemtex Fibers, Inc., 617 F. Supp. 55
(S.D.N.Y. 1985), in which the court said on the authority of Mitsubishi that "[w]hatever the
permissible inquiry after conclusion of an arbitration proceeding, it is clear that the Con-
vention does not contemplate the expression of local public policy as a barrier to the arbi-
trability of claims." Id at 57 n.12.
113 Misubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3371 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"14 Id at 3360.
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of the law.""15 "Manifest disregard of the law" is not one of the
grounds for setting aside an award under section 10 of the Arbitra-
tion Act, which speaks of a lack of a "mutual, final and definitive
award.""16 The Convention does not list "manifest disregard" as a
basis for refusing to enforce an award.
While courts have not vacated cases for an ordinary error of law,
they have vacated cases for a "manifest disregard of the law.""1
7
The application of this standard is made more difficult by the paucity
of precedent indicating what might justify vacating an award for
manifest disregard of the law."18 Whether "manifest disregard"
would be considered to be contrary to the public policy of the United
States is not clear. Public policy as a defense to enforcement is often
invoked and nearly always rejected. It is said to be limited to cases
when "enforcement would violate the forum state's most basic no-
tions of morality and justice."' "19 Whatever the test, its scope is yet
to be determined.
A related question is that of the preclusive effect of an award.
Neither the majority nor the dissenting opinion in Mitsubishi has any-
thing to say about this. Ordinarily, issues decided through arbitra-
tion may not be relitigated. The award may be introduced into
evidence and is conclusive as to matters decided.' 20 The Supreme
Court has recently limited the application of this general principle.
In Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd 121 the Court said: "We believe
the preclusive effect of arbitration proceedings is significantly less
well settled than the lower court opinions might suggest," and went
on to say that "it is far from certain that arbitration proceedings will
have any preclusive effect on nonarbitrable federal claims."' 2 2 In
McDonald v. City of West Branch 123 the Court pointed out that arbitral
"15 Id at 3370 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
116 9 U.S.C. § 10(d) (1982).
117 See McClendon, Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in the United States, 4 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 1, 65 (1982).
118 In San Martine Compania de Navigacion v. Saguenay Terminals, 293 F.2d 796 (9th
Cir. 1961), the court said "a manifest disregard of the law ... might be present when
arbitrators understand and correctly state the law, but proceed to disregard the same." Id
at 801. There are, however, almost no cases in which manifest disregard has been found.
In British Airtours Ltd. v. New England Travel Corp., Civ. No. 83-618 (D. Conn. Aug. 7,
1985), however, the court found that an arbitrator had exceeded his authority by making
an award under an indemnity clause when the claimant had not claimed a loss. The court
characterized this as manifest disregard of the law. See also Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co.,
469 F.2d 1211, 1214 (2d Cir. 1972); A/S Siljestad v. Hideca Trading, Inc., 541 F. Supp.
58, 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
119 Parsons & Whittemore, 508 F.2d at 974; see also Fotochrome Inc. v. Copal Co., 517
F.2d 512, 516 (2d Cir. 1976).
120 5 Am. Jut. 2D Arbitration and Award § 147 (1962), cited with approval in American
Renaissance Lines, Inc. v. Saxis S.S. Co., 502 F.2d 674, 679 (2d Cir. 1974); see also Ivery v.
United States, 686 F.2d 410, 414 (6th Cir. 1982).
121 105 S. Ct. at 1244.
122 1d a
123 104 S. Ct. at 1799.
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awards are not "judicial proceedings" under the full faith and credit
statute.' 2 4 Thus, federal courts are not obligated by statute to give
awards res judicata or collateral estoppel effect. Any rule of preclu-
sion, therefore, will necessarily be judicially crafted. 125
With the great public interest in antitrust enforcement, it is
likely that an award implicating antitrust issues would be given nar-
row effect and would obviously have no precedential effect in anti-
trust suits brought by the Justice Department. It could not be
effective against anyone not a party to the arbitration. The effect of
an award on the litigation of those claims over which the district
court in Mitsubishi retained jurisdiction is not clear.' 26
The Court in Mitsubishi did not decide whether arbitrators may
award treble damages. It said only that "[t]he importance of the pri-
vate [treble damages] remedy ... does not compel the conclusion
that it may not be sought outside an American court."1 27 There is
no reason why arbitrators should not be able to award treble dam-
ages. Arbitrators generally have almost unlimited powers to fashion
relief,' 28 although some courts have refused to enforce awards for
punitive damages, at least where such damages are not authorized by
statute.1 29 Where treble damages are specifically authorized by stat-
ute, as in antitrust cases, arbitrators could not award them. A more
interesting question is what might happen to an award that includes
damages for an antitrust violation but fails to treble them.' 30
Finally, although a detailed discussion of the matter is beyond
the scope of this article, Mitsubishi raises the question whether the
Supreme Court will, in a future decision, declare antitrust issues ar-
bitrable in domestic as well as international cases. There are several
reasons why it might. Most important is the skepticism the Court
evinced toward the American Safety doctrine.1' ! After stating that its
skepticism extended only to "some aspects" of that doctrine, the
Court discredited three of its four prongs. This left only the "core"
of the doctrine, which the Court defined as "the fundamental impor-
tance to American democratic capitalism of the regime of the anti-
trust laws."' 3 2
124 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982).
125 McDonald, 104 S. Ct. at 1802.
126 Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3351 n.7.
127 Id. at 3358-59.
128 See, e.g., AM. ARB. A. COM. ARB. R. 43.
129 See South E. Ad. Shipping Ltd. v. Garnac Grain Co., 356 F.2d 189, 192 (2d Cir.
1966); Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831
(1976); but see Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 353
(N.D. Ala. 1984).
1so For a discussion of potential complications when international arbitrations involve
treble damages and semi-penal remedies, see Newman & Burrows, Consequences of Interna.
tionalArbitration of Antitns and RICO, N.Y.LJ., Dec. 23, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
131 Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3357.
132 I& at 3358.
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In a domestic arbitration case, neither the public policy favoring
international trade nor the Convention is available to support anti-
trust claim arbitrability. The Mitsubishi Court, however, indicated
that the main reason for denying arbitrability of antitrust claims is
the important role played by private litigation in antitrust enforce-
ment. The importance of private litigation need not preclude arbi-
trability. Mitsubishi held that: "[slo long as the prospective litigant
effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral
forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deter-
rent function."' 33 The Mitsubishi rationale, while limited to the inter-
national context, applies with equal force to domestic antitrust
disputes.
In support of a finding of arbitrability of domestic antitrust suits,
the Court could cite the desirability of reducing the volume of anti-
trust litigation through arbitration and other forms of alternate dis-
pute resolution. Lower federal courts have noted that antitrust
claims are often frivolous.' 3 4 By permitting arbitration of antitrust
claims, the volume of unmeritorious claims could be reduced.' 35
Furthermore, claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO),' 3 6 which have been held nonarbitrable
on the authority of American Safety, are increasing.13 7 The prospect of
additional frivolous claims in contract actions might provide the in-
centive necessary to widen subject matter arbitrability in domestic
cases.
V. Conclusion
In view of the Supreme Court's commitment to resolving doubt-
ful cases in favor of arbitration and of Chief Justice Burger's great
interest in reducing the volume of litigation in the courts by the use
of arbitration and other forms of alternate dispute resolution, 38 it
seems likely that courts will continue to expand the role of arbitra-
tion. Although the Court did not mention this issue in Mitsubishi,
lower federal courts have noted that antitrust claims in contract dis-
putes are often frivolous. Once in arbitration, parties occasionally
assert such claims to avoid the arbitral process. Arbitrators should
have no difficulty recognizing and rejecting unmeritorious antitrust
'33 Id. at 3359-60.
'34 See, e.g., Reisner v. General Motors Corp., 511 F. Supp. 1167, 1178 n.25 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), af'd, 671 F.2d 91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982).
135 See Lake Communications, Inc. v. ICC Corp., 738 F.2d 1473, 1480 (9th Cir. 1984).
136 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
137 See generally Nathan, Doubling the Treble Damage Option: What an Antitrust Practitioner
Needs To Know About RICO, 52 A'rTrnusT LJ. 327 (1983).
138 Chief Justice Burger has spoken and written on this subject many times; see, e.g.,
Burger, Using Arbitration To Achieve Justice, 40 ARB. J. 4 (1985).
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claims with the result that they would disappear from court calendars
and reduce the courts' workload.
The rationale in Mitsubishi will undoubtedly be extended to most
other statutory claims arising in international commercial arbitra-
tion. It has already been extended to apply to RICO claims, previ-
ously nonarbitrable because of their similarity to antitrust claims. 13 9
It is not inconceivable that the Supreme Court will ultimately decide
that antitrust and RICO claims are arbitrable in a domestic context
as well. Whether this occurs, the future battleground in interna-
tional arbitration will almost surely be over the scope of review of
international awards implicating a statutory right. Such review might
occur in enforcement proceedings in which courts can refuse to en-
force awards contrary to public policy. Review could also occur at
the time of later litigation of the same or similar subject matter, when
the preclusive effect to be given to the arbitral award is determined.
In the meantime, however, the arbitral process will perform a useful
function by winnowing out frivolous statutory claims from those that
have merit.
139 In S.A. Mineracao da Trinidade-Samitri v. Utah Int'l Inc., 576 F. Supp. 566
(S.D.N.Y. 1983). afd, 745 F.2d 190 (2d Cir. 1984), the court refused to allow arbitration
of RICO claims raised under a "broad" arbitration clause; but see Chemtex Fibers, Inc., 617 F.
Supp. at 55. In Chewm= an action based in part on a RICO claim was stayed and the parties
ordered to arbitration. The court said that the domestic interest in RICO enforcement
was "arguably a great deal less strong" than the interest in antitrust enforcement and was
overcome by the compelling interest in certainty and predictability in international com-
mercial transactions. Id at 57.
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